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Abstract 
Cognitive abilities cannot be measured directly. What we can measure is individual variation 
in task performance. In this paper, we first make the case for why we should be interested in 
mapping individual differences in task performance on to particular cognitive abilities: we 
suggest it is crucial for examining the causes and consequences of variation both within and 
between species. As a case study, we examine whether multiple measures of inhibitory 
control for nonhuman animals do indeed produce correlated task performance; however, no 
clear pattern emerges that would support the notion of a common cognitive ability 
underpinning individual differences in performance. We advocate a psychometric approach 
involving a three-step program to make theoretical and empirical progress: first, we need 
tasks that reveal signature limits in performance. Second, we need to assess the reliability of 
individual differences in task performance. Third, multi-trait multi-method test batteries will be 
instrumental in validating cognitive abilities. Together, these steps will help us to establish 
what varies between individuals that could impact their fitness, and ultimately shape the 
course of the evolution of animal minds. Finally, we propose executive functions, including 
working memory, inhibitory control, and attentional shifting, as a sensible starting point for 
this endeavour. 
Keywords: Individual differences; construct validity; executive functions; inhibitory control; 
comparative cognition; multi-trait multi-method test batteries 
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The combination of the comparative method (i.e., comparing relevant traits across species) 
and analysing individual differences has proved to be a powerful approach to elucidate the 
evolution of physical traits. In principle, understanding the evolution of cognition can benefit 
from a similar approach. However, the study of cognitive evolution is complicated by the fact 
that cognition cannot be directly measured, instead it must be inferred from measuring the 
physical substrate that underpins it (the brain), and its expression (behaviour) [1]. Initial 
theories of cognitive evolution were based on differences in relative brain size between taxa, 
and correlations with various socio-ecological factors such as group size [2-4] and dietary 
diversity [3, 5]. Although brain size is a crude index of cognitive ability [6], it does correlate 
with observational records of behaviour, such as tool use, social learning and innovation, in 
both mammals and birds [7, 8]. Nevertheless, it has proved difficult to discriminate between 
theories for cognitive evolution based on this indirect evidence [9]. A satisfying account of 
cognitive evolution must describe the trait that is evolving more precisely.  
Comparative psychologists have attempted to measure species differences in cognition 
more directly, by conducting experiments on different species either in the field or in the 
laboratory (for recent reviews, see [10, 11]). Though this brings us one step closer to 
measuring cognition, experimental psychologists have long recognised that species 
differences in performance on cognitive tests could result from multiple sources [12]. Such 
contributing causes include species differences in perception, temperament, motor control, 
body morphology, domain general cognitive abilities, etc. that are peripheral to the targeted 
cognitive ability [13]. Additionally, cohort differences in experience or demographics can 
complicate species comparisons, particularly on a single task. Control conditions 
(administered within the same species and cohort) can help us ascertain that the results are 
not solely ascribable to these peripheral factors, though it is hard to be exhaustive in ruling 
out alternative causes for species differences in this way. Another approach is to seek 
positive evidence that the test is measuring the targeted ability through examination of 
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individual differences. In other words to explore whether or not the cognitive ability can be 
shown to contribute to performance across different tasks. 
In recent years, there has therefore been a shift toward examining individual variation in 
performance across multiple tasks rather than group performance in a single task [14-16], 
(though the importance of individual variation has been recognised for a long time, e.g., 
[17]). To that end, researchers have designed and administered test batteries to identify 
factors underlying individual differences in task performance. Most of these studies to date 
have been concerned with the question whether a common factor, commonly referred to as 
g, can be identified that accounts for between-subject variance across different tasks. Many 
comparative studies have found evidence for such a factor, others have not (for a recent 
review, see [18]). There are many possible explanations for the existence of g and we agree 
with others who have argued that evidence for a psychometric g factor does not entail the 
presence or absence of an overarching, domain-general reasoning ability that can be 
deployed for very diverse purposes [19-21].  
In this paper, one of our goals is to analyse different approaches to test battery design with a 
view towards promoting a more systematic approach. We argue that it is time to go beyond 
the question whether or not g can be identified and advocate a three-step program for 
designing test batteries that can elucidate the structure of cognition (i.e., what are the 
dissociable components of cognition and in what way are they related with one another?). To 
this end, the question of measurement is of central importance. Which cognitive abilities can 
be validated across different contexts (e.g., different behavioural tasks) and measured 
reliably across time? Little work to date has been dedicated to this important question. 
Giving more attention to validating cognitive abilities (see Box 1 for definition and discussion 
of test validity) will allow us to answer more detailed questions regarding the causes and 
consequences of individual differences in cognition [16, 22]. Rather than looking for socio-
ecological correlates of g one can look for correlations between particular cognitive abilities 
and certain socio-ecological variables [12]. An example for such a targeted approach is the 
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correlation between inhibitory control measures and fission-fusion dynamics across different 
primate species [23]. This kind of process-oriented approach could also be used within 
species to study the consequences of individual differences. While some recent evidence 
suggests that problem-solving abilities are related to fitness [24-26], other studies have not 
found this association [27]. However, it is largely unclear which (or indeed whether [13]) 
cognitive abilities underlie successful problem solving in these cases. Uncovering whether or 
not variation in individual performance reliably measures variation in a certain cognitive 
ability is, we argue, a logical precursor to interpreting correlations with fitness (or lack 
thereof). If individual differences in task performance result largely from differences in 
experience or motivation, such differences are unlikely to be related to fitness, as they are 
transient. Conversely, if individual differences track body condition or health, correlations 
with fitness might be expected because of some interaction with this third variable, whether 
or not the task is a valid measure of a certain cognitive ability. Finally, with information about 
which cognitive abilities can be identified and how they are related to one another (i.e., the 
structure of cognition), one could start to ask further questions about how cognition evolves: 
for example, are certain abilities likely to undergo correlated evolution, or might they be 
traded off against one another? 
Targeted test batteries: from g to more specific questions  
The first step in test battery design is to specify the cognitive abilities to be tested. The 
second step is to specify what tasks are supposed to measure these abilities. Both trait (e.g., 
short-term memory) and task (e.g., finding food under a cup after a delay) selection will likely 
affect the latent variable structure supported by the study. Despite its influence on the 
generalisability of the results, often little justification of the trait and task selection is 
provided, especially in test batteries looking for a g factor. An unbalanced task selection, for 
example with a bias on learning tasks or spatial cognition tasks, might limit the conclusions 
that can be drawn from the results [16, 22]. 
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Two main approaches guiding trait and task selection can be identified. The first, which we 
have labelled the ‘ethological’ approach, is based on a careful analysis of a species’ socio-
ecological challenges and its typical behavioural solutions to these challenges. We will 
review an example for this approach, the Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) [28]. The 
benefit of this approach is that it provides researchers with a good starting point for the 
design of ethologically valid tasks that are likely to tap into survival-relevant cognitive 
abilities. However, these tasks have usually not been designed with the explicit goal of 
investigating correlations of between-subject variation in performance. This can result in 
tasks that do not yield large between-subject variation, for instance, due to ceiling or floor 
effects or due to an insufficient number of trials per individual. The second, ‘psychological’ 
approach to test battery construction, is based on previous cognitive studies with the same 
or different species (e.g., based on the human psychometric literature). This approach is 
anchored in specific hypotheses about cognitive abilities which guide task selection criteria. 
For example, these hypotheses might specify response profiles (i.e., how an individual’s 
performance is affected by different experimental manipulations) or error patterns in 
performance that the candidate tasks should provoke. In practice, the two approaches can 
overlap. Irrespective of the approach taken, using an established test battery for a different 
species might require significant task adjustments. Initial experimentation is essential to 
ensure that the tasks are suitable for the species of interest, especially when a test battery is 
transferred to a distantly related taxon (e.g., from primates to birds or fish [29, 30]).  
In the next sections, we will briefly review the results of the ‘ethological’ and ‘psychological’ 
approaches to test battery construction with examples from studies of primate cognitive 
evolution. Following this analysis we will propose some guiding principles for test battery 
design that arise from evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the work to date. 
The primate cognition test battery (PCTB) 
Herrmann and colleagues initially designed the PCTB to compare the cognitive abilities of 
different great ape species (2.5-year-old human children, chimpanzees Pan troglodytes, and 
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orangutans Pongo pygmaeus) at the group level [28]. In line with the ’ethological’ approach, 
the design of the test battery was based on a review of the primate cognition literature 
examining challenges from the physical and social cognitive domains [31]. Although task 
design in the PCTB was anchored in the challenges faced by these species in their daily 
lives (to find and locate food, use tools, and deal with conspecifics), the hypothesis being 
tested had to do with the structure of the underlying cognition: namely that social cognition 
would be dissociable from physical cognition, and capable of evolving separately. The 
group-level analysis revealed some support for this notion, because 2.5-year-old children 
outperformed chimpanzees and orangutans in the social cognitive domain but performed 
similarly to chimpanzees in the physical cognitive domain. However, as described above, 
these species differences in some tasks but not others could still in principle be the result of 
non-cognitive species differences [32, 33]. 
Analysis of individual differences in performance can be used to further investigate the 
structure of cognition. In a later re-analysis of the original dataset of chimpanzees (N = 106) 
and children (N = 105) [34], between-subject variation in performance was examined even 
though the PCTB was not designed for this purpose. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
did not endorse the original division of the test battery into a social and a physical cognitive 
domain, though it did yield dissociable components. Instead, a spatial cognition factor could 
be identified both in chimpanzees and human children. For children there were two 
additional factors, one that included the shared variance of some of the nonspatial physical 
cognition tasks (i.e., tool use and numerical cognition) and one capturing individual variation 
in social cognition tasks. For chimpanzees, there was one additional factor onto which some 
of the social and (nonspatial) physical cognition tasks loaded.  
In a replication of the PCTB with another chimpanzee sample (N = 99), Hopkins et al. [35] 
found a different underlying structure using a principal component analysis (PCA): all spatial 
cognition tasks loaded on component 1, tool-related tasks and causal reasoning tasks 
loaded on component 2, and all social cognitive tasks loaded on a third component. Hopkins 
7 
 
and colleagues also found evidence for test-retest reliability of the measures, though there 
was some improvement in the spatial and numerical cognition tasks over time. They also 
found evidence for a common g factor. Moreover, they found evidence for heritability of this 
composite score. 
Multiple differences could account for inconsistent latent variable structures between the two 
chimpanzee studies: apart from differences in the statistical analyses (CFA vs PCA), the 
later study by Hopkins and colleagues [35] included only 13 out of the original 15 tasks. One 
of these tasks, the addition task, loaded on the physical-social factor identified by Herrmann 
et al. [34]. It is therefore possible that the inconsistent results might be due to methodological 
differences between the studies rather than differences between the two chimpanzee 
samples. This highlights the vital importance of task choice and inclusion in test battery 
design. Nevertheless, the results from the PCTB yielded patterns of correlation and 
dissociation that provided some evidence for construct validity (see Box 1), in particular for 
spatial cognition, although the details of cognitive mechanisms underlying these common 
factors remain opaque.  
Beyond g and social / physical cognition?  
In the following, we will review some studies that have been anchored in a more 
‘psychological’ approach to test-battery design. Rather than starting from ethology and using 
factor analysis to examine the structure of the underlying cognition, these studies start from 
hypotheses about the nature of cognition, and have compared species that inhabit different 
socio-ecological niches to examine hypotheses about the evolutionary 
causes/consequences of differences in specific cognitive abilities. Aside from the 
aforementioned studies of g, most of the studies using this approach have focussed on 
inhibitory control.  
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Inhibitory control  
Inhibitory control is often described as a component of executive functions (EFs), a suite of 
domain general, partially independent cognitive abilities that are important in maintaining 
goals even in the presence of interference and switching flexibly between goals. Inhibitory 
control (for a critique of this term, see [36]) includes response inhibition and interference 
control. Response inhibition refers to the top-down capacity to suppress a (stimulus-driven) 
prepotent response and / or to activate another (memory-based) response instead. 
Interference control refers to the ability to focus on goal-relevant information in the presence 
of distracting information (for a recent overview article on the terminology and definitions, 
see [37]).  
Such a domain general cognitive ability should lead to consistent individual differences 
across different contexts. In the human literature the evidence for such a common cognitive 
ability is mixed [38-42]. A large-scale meta-analysis (based on 282 samples and over 33,000 
participants) examined convergent validity of self-control measures with human adults [43]. 
They found modest convergence of measures of self-control (defined here as “top-down 
processes that inhibit or obviate impulses”, p. 260 [43]) with informant-report and self-report 
questionnaires yielding the highest convergence scores and executive function tasks (the 
most frequently used tasks were go-nogo, Stroop, and set shifting paradigms) exhibiting 
smaller, yet significant convergent validity with other EF tasks (average Pearson correlation 
coefficient among EF tasks: r = 0.15). There was also a significant correlation among delay 
of gratification tasks (DoG; average correlation coefficient: r = 0.21) but notably no significant 
correlations between DoG and other EF tasks (average correlation coefficient: r = 0.11). It 
has been suggested that temporal discounting makes DoG tasks different to other inhibitory 
control tasks [10]. Temporal discounting refers to the degradation of the subjective value of a 
reward with increasing delays. Individual differences in temporal discounting might therefore 
be supported by different cognitive processes [37, 44]. Indeed investigations of the neural 
correlates of response inhibition and choice impulsivity (or temporal discounting) cast doubt 
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on whether the same cognitive processes are involved here [45], which would explain the 
inconsistent individual differences between DoG and other self-control tasks.  
Nevertheless, this meta-analysis is consistent with the notion of some common cognitive 
ability underpinning tasks aiming at measuring inhibitory control in humans, though it seems 
unlikely to be unitary. In fact, it has been proposed that  inhibitory control can be further 
decomposed into three subcomponents including stimulus detection, action selection, and 
action execution [46]. Whether this common factor should be labelled inhibitory control (or a 
suite of inhibitory control abilities) depends on whether discriminant validity (see Box 1) can 
be established with other constructs such as general intelligence, shifting, and working 
memory.  An assessment of individual differences in EF in humans showed that tasks aiming 
at measuring inhibitory control did not load onto an independent factor but on a common 
factor of EF [47]. It therefore seems questionable to treat all of the tasks entered in this 
meta-analysis (such as set shifting paradigms) as primary measures of inhibitory control (we 
discuss the task impurity problem further below). 
In the comparative literature two fairly large-scale studies have administered cognitive test 
batteries that were explicitly designed to compare species in their inhibitory control ability 
[23, 48]. However, without first establishing convergent and divergent validity of the deployed 
inhibition measures, it is unclear if this would assay one ability or several. Amici et al. 
presented five tasks aiming at inhibitory control to six different primate species [23]. Some of 
these tasks were based on classical psychological tasks of inhibitory control (e.g., the A-not-
B error), others were somewhat more ethologically grounded, such as detour-reaching tasks. 
They found an association between performance on these tasks and sociality, with species 
that have a more fluid social structure (fission-fusion) performing better on average than 
those with less complex social organisation. MacLean et al. presented two inhibitory control 
tasks (A-not-B and the cylinder task, a detour-reaching test) to 567 individuals representing 
36 species with a wide phylogenetic coverage [48]. They found a correlation between test 
performance and absolute brain volume (but see [49, 50] for recent evidence with corvids 
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questioning this finding) and, for primates, an association with ecology (dietary diversity). 
Implicit in the rationale for both studies is that inhibitory control is a unitary, domain general 
ability undergoing evolutionary change, though the results point to different selection 
pressures at work. However, although performance in the A-not-B error and cylinder task of 
the MacLean et al. dataset was correlated at the species level (when controlling for 
phylogeny [48]) individual differences were not examined. In the following, we examine these 
datasets from an individual differences perspective, to explore the evidence to date for 
construct validity of inhibitory control in the comparative framework (see Box 1). However, it 
should be noted that only three of the species in the Amici et al. dataset (spider monkeys, 
Ateles geoffroyi, N = 18; capuchin monkeys, Sapajus apella, N = 27; long-tailed macaques, 
Macaca fascicularis, N = 12) received more than two trials per task and can provide 
therefore measures of individual variance; similarly, only a subset of individuals in the 
MacLean et al. study received both tasks (N = 216). 
 
BOX 1 
Establishing Test Validity 
Content validity 
The starting point for establishing content validity is to determine the nature of a 
cognitive ability on theoretical and / or empirical grounds. In other words, researchers 
need to agree on features defining the ability of interest [51]. Often the rich body of 
cognitive research with humans can provide initial guidelines, especially in cases with 
limited pre-existing comparative research. The aim is to make predictions about 
response profiles, error patterns, or signature limits that are specific to the cognitive 
ability under investigation. Based on these considerations, researchers can design 
experiments in which they manipulate task complexity to reveal the hypothesized 
response profiles and signature limits within individuals. At the group level these 
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signature limits should also be evident in comparison with control conditions that do 
not tax the targeted cognitive ability to the same extent as the test condition.  
In the realm of executive functions (EF), such content validity criteria include 
susceptibility to task interference in working memory tasks and switch costs in 
attentional set shifting paradigms. Inhibitory control measures should yield response 
profiles and signature limits indicative of a prepotent response. Variability in inhibitory 
control can only be measured when there is some prepotency or interference that 
needs to be overridden. Prepotency, however, can only be shown when individuals at 
least occasionally make mistakes (e.g., when individuals of a species occasionally 
bump into a transparent cylinder when they try to reach a reward inside the cylinder). 
Ceiling (or floor) effects in performance make it impossible to establish content validity 
(e.g., great ape species performed close to or at ceiling in inhibitory control tasks 
including the cylinder and the A-not-B error task [23, 48, 52]). Ideally, researchers can 
design experiments that manipulate the task complexity with respect to the signature 
limits they are interested in. For inhibitory control tasks this can be realized by 
manipulating the strength of the prepotent response. For example, in a go / no-go 
paradigm increasing the relative frequency of go trials should negatively impact on the 
no-go performance [53]. 
Another strategy to reduce interpretational ambiguity is to focus on error 
patterns. Often mistakes can be more informative than success [54]. However, even if 
the performance is not at ceiling, errors might be related to factors other than the 
prepotent response (e.g., motivation, distractibility). Sometimes the task design can 
mitigate this problem by including various opportunities for making mistakes. The type 
of mistakes may hint toward different underlying causes. An example of such a task 
design is the A-not-B error task with three aligned cups: repeated exposure to hiding 
events of a target object under cup A can induce a search response toward cup A 
even when in probe trials the target object is hidden under cup B in full view of the 
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participant (the so-called A-not-B error). Adding a third cup (C) to the setup that is 
never used as a hiding place allows for distinguishing between inhibitory control errors 
(cup A) induced by the previous exposure to cup-A hiding events and unspecific 
mistakes (cup C) in probe trials (when the target object is in cup B). In this way, adding 
different options for making mistakes will improve the task design by allowing the 
content validity of the task to be assessed.  
Construct validity 
Construct validity aims at triangulating variables (constructs) that account for 
variance in task performance [51]. Multiple tasks aiming at the same ability (but 
differing in peripheral task demands and stimulus appearance) should ideally produce 
shared variance in performance attributable to a common factor (convergent validity). 
Conversely, tasks that aim to measure different traits should not produce highly shared 
variance (discriminant validity). Convergent and discriminant validity together bolster 
construct validity. Based on shared variance across tasks alone it remains unclear 
what the shared variance actually represents (e.g., general intelligence or a more 
specific cognitive ability). Multiple traits should therefore be examined within the same 
test battery to tease out what is shared and what is distinct, to discriminate and label 
latent variables. In this way, a multi-trait multi-method approach can help to establish 
construct validity and to elucidate the structure of cognitive abilities [55]. 
Correlating task performance at the species or group level is not sufficient for 
establishing construct validity at the individual level (within each species of interest). 
This is because species may differ in their performance in multiple tests due to 
differences in another variable (such as motivation), leading to correlated performance 
at the group level but not at the individual level. 
END OF BOX 1 
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To test the convergence of the two measures administered by MacLean et al. [48], we 
modelled the influence of accuracy in the A-not-B error task (1 trial: correct/incorrect) on the 
performance in the cylinder task (number of correct responses: 0 -10). If the two tasks 
measure individual differences in the same cognitive ability, i.e. response inhibition, one 
might predict that individuals who choose the correct cup in the A-not-B error task, would 
also perform well in the cylinder task (compared with individuals who committed the A-not-B 
error). We included all tested species from the MacLean et al. dataset with more than six 
individuals participating in both tasks (in total 192 individual representing 15 species, see 
Fig. 1). We used a Poisson generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) to analyse the number 
of correct trials in the cylinder task and added A-not-B error task performance as predictor 
variable and species and subject ID as a random effect (see ESM for more information on 
model assumptions and the detailed model output). We found that the A-not-B error task 
was not significantly associated with the cylinder task performance (GLMM 01: χ2(1) =2.13, p 
= 0.145). When we excluded two species that exhibited ceiling effects in the A-not-B error 
task (orangutans and olive baboons) the p-value was slightly smaller (GLMM 02: χ2(1) =3.28, 
p = 0.070). However, if anything, individuals that successfully located the food in the A-not-B 
error task tended to perform worse in the cylinder task (according to the model by 18%) 
compared with those that committed the A-not-B error (Estimate ± SE: -0.19 ±0.11, 95% CI 
[-0.41, 0.02]). The overall pattern of results did not change when we only analysed the 10 
primate species (GLMM 03). The power to detect an estimate of 0.3 (corresponding to a 
35% increase in cylinder task performance) for the predictor A-not-B Error Task 
Performance was 81.2% for GLMM 01 (GLMM 02: 73.9%; GLMM 03: 61.2%; see ESM for 
details). In line with these results, a previous study in dogs (Canis familiaris, N = 30)  
focusing on individuals differences did not find evidence for convergent validity of these two 
tasks [56]. Similarly, a recent study with pheasants (Phasianus colchicus, N = 81) found no 
evidence for correlated performance in two detour tasks involving transparent materials 
blocking direct access to a food reward [57]. Moreover, the content validity of the A-not-B 
paradigm has recently been challenged as hand-tracking training but not experience with 
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another inhibitory control task (reversal learning) substantially improved the A-not-B error 
task performance of New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) [50]. 
 
Figure 1 Mean performance (± SE) in the cylinder task (percent correct out of 10 trials) of the 
MacLean et al. [49] dataset as a function of species (ranked by overall performance in the 
cylinder task) and performance in the A-not-B error task (correct / incorrect, 1 trial). Only the 
performance of individuals that completed both tasks is shown. 
 
In the Amici et al. dataset [23], we correlated individual performance across four different 
inhibitory control measures (see ESM). The sample sizes for each pairwise comparison 
ranged from 5 to 19 depending on the task comparison and the species. The small sample 
sizes and resulting low power (7 – 24 % assuming a medium effect of r = 0.3, see ESM) 
would therefore not allow us to detect weak to moderate correlations. To detect medium 
effects with a satisfactory power of 80 % a sample size of 84 individuals would be required. 
However, we expected to find at least positive correlation coefficients if these tasks 
measured the same underlying ability. We found no such simple picture. In particular, the 
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delay of gratification (DoG) task did not seem to be related consistently with the other 
inhibitory control measures within any of the different species (5 out of 9 correlations 
coefficients were negative). Indeed, there was even a significant negative correlation 
between DoG and the Middle-cup task for the spider monkeys. The other tasks showed 
more consistent individual differences within each species (8 out of 9 correlation coefficients 
were positive across species, but only two of these correlations were also statistically 
significant, see ESM). These tasks relied on prepotent responses induced by tendencies to 
either reach for visible food directly (Plexiglas hole), repeat previously rewarded choices (A-
not-B error), or follow a proximity bias when searching for hidden food rewards (Middle cup). 
The lack of relationship between DoG and other inhibitory control measures in this study is 
consistent with the above-mentioned meta-analysis of the EF literature with human adults, 
which found no clear pattern of correlation between DoG tasks and other EF tasks (including 
classic response inhibition tasks [43]). 
From our analysis of the studies on inhibitory control we have found little evidence for 
convergent validity in this cognitive domain. Importantly, even if the multiple measures had 
yielded correlated performance it would remain unclear what the shared variance 
represents. For example, even if we had found evidence for convergence of different 
inhibitory control measures, we still would not know whether we could attribute the shared 
variance to inhibitory control or another ability. The lack of convergent validity of different 
inhibitory control measures might be attributable to low statistical power (especially in the 
case of the Amici et al. dataset) or masking effects of confounding factors (other cognitive 
abilities, non-cognitive factors including motivation, etc.), or it might indicate that inhibitory 
control is not a unitary ability. Only the multi-trait multi-method approach with sufficient 
sample sizes could help to mitigate this interpretational challenge by establishing both 
convergent and discriminant validity. Following the human literature on EF, multiple 
measures per traits (e.g., updating, shifting, and inhibition) would be needed [47]. As we 
have seen in this section, further task development for nonhuman animals is required for the 
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assessment of inhibitory control. In the final section, we discuss how the multi-trait multi-
method approach might be implemented in comparative psychology. 
The structure of cognition: A problem with two unknowns 
Our review of the literature has identified several pitfalls in the use of test batteries to 
elucidate the structure of individual differences from a comparative perspective, even when 
studies focused on a single trait (e.g., inhibitory control) measured by multiple tasks. One of 
the main challenges for the investigation of individual differences in cognitive abilities is that 
we start with two unknowns: first, we don’t know what our tasks measure (the so-called task 
impurity problem, see [58]) and, second, we don’t know which cognitive traits exist and can 
be measured within a species (the construct validity problem).  
All behavioural tasks are “impure”, in the sense that it is not possible to isolate and measure 
a cognitive ability with a single task. Confounding factors that contribute to task performance 
are other cognitive abilities (apart from the target ability) and non-cognitive factors including 
motivation, personality traits [59, 60], and prior experience [13]. To complicate matters even 
further, the cognitive and non-cognitive factors that contribute to task performance might 
vary between individuals, and they may not lead to stable effects across time. For example, 
over time some individuals, unlike others, might adopt strategies to cope with the task 
demands more efficiently which in turn will affect the cognitive load of the task for these 
individuals. 
We advocate a three-step solution to tackle these problems:  
1. First, establish content validity. Does performance on the task accord with theoretical 
principles underlying the hypothesised ability? There are two main tools to examining 
this, firstly signature limits in performance, and secondly systematic variation across 
conditions. Signature limits refers to the way individuals make mistakes (including 
commission and omission mistakes). Analysing these error patterns can help to 
establish the content validity of a task [54]. Systematic variation refers to initial 
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experimental work showing at the group level that the test condition differs from 
control conditions in meaningful ways (as predicted by the targeted ability). 
Importantly, tasks that reveal such signature limits or systematic variation need to be 
established for every species under study, as a task that has demonstrable content 
validity for one species might not be appropriate for another. 
2. The second step is to assess the repeatability (or test-retest reliability) of candidate 
measures. Only tasks that yield a consistent ranking of individual performance over 
time are good candidates for capturing cognitive abilities. Depending on the ability 
under investigation learning effects might hinder the assessment of test-retest 
reliability (e.g. due to ceiling effects in the retest). Changing the task-relevant stimuli 
between test and retest can help to remedy this problem.  
3. Third, valid and reliable measures of individual variation in a cognitive ability can be 
combined in a multi-trait multi-method test battery to deal with task impurity and the 
construct validity problem [55]. The aim of such a latent variable approach is to 
establish convergent and discriminant validity, the constituents of construct validity 
(see Box 1).  
Each of these steps aiming at content validity, repeatability, and construct validity will require 
intense and possibly coordinated research effort. Our contention is that these steps should 
be undertaken in order for a study of individual differences in cognition to be maximally 
meaningful. Fortunately, each of the steps constitute interesting research questions in their 
own right.  
One complication concerns the optimal choice of tasks at each step. Step 1 is made easier 
with robust effects (replicable at the group level) that can support statistical tests between 
different conditions. However, there is no guarantee that a valid and robust test of an ability 
will yield individual variation in that ability across individuals, which is needed for Steps 2 and 
3. In fact, the most robust tests may not translate into reliable measures of individual 
differences precisely because they tend to be associated with small between-subject 
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variance [40]. Moreover, it is important to consider what kind of dependent variables are 
extracted from the task. Difference scores (e.g., test condition performance subtracted by 
control condition performance) can have a lower signal-to-noise ratio compared to their 
constituents (e.g. the test condition performance) and therefore might not provide sensitive 
measures [40, 61]. Nevertheless, difference scores might remove systematic between-
subject variation in performance unrelated to the cognitive ability under investigation (which 
is desirable for Step 3). Having the three-step program in mind at the outset of task design is 
therefore beneficial for future-proofing tasks, for example by exploring multiple levels of 
difficulty in Step 1, to allow difficulty to be titrated at Steps 2 and 3 to avoid floor and ceiling 
effects.  
Future directions for the psychological approach 
We deem EFs a good starting point for the assessment of individuals differences in 
behavioural flexibility for multiple reasons: EFs are thought to be domain general processes 
that affect the performance in most behavioural tasks. Twin studies suggest that individual 
differences in EFs in humans are almost entirely of genetic origin [62]. Moreover, EFs are 
correlated with mental and physical health measures in humans (for a review, see [63]) and 
survival (in the context of chronic illness [64]). Thus, EFs might also be the ideal candidate 
for looking into causes and consequences of individual differences in cognition.  
To date most research attention has been devoted to three skills that together are thought to 
represent the pillars of EF: working memory updating, attentional shifting (also known as set 
shifting or cognitive flexibility), and inhibition (including response inhibition and interference 
control). The multi-trait multi-method approach has been applied to study the structure of 
individual differences in EFs in humans including multiple tasks aiming at updating, shifting, 
and inhibition [47, 58]. According to one of the most influential models of human executive 
functions by Miyake and Friedman, there is a common factor onto which all of these tasks 
load [65]. Additionally, there are two nested factors, an updating-specific factor and a 
shifting-specific factor, that represent the shared variance unique to the updating and shifting 
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tasks. The shared variance of the inhibition tasks, however, cannot be differentiated from the 
common EF factor. In human preschool children, in contrast, a single factor seems to be 
sufficient to account for individual differences across EF tasks [66, 67]. The latent variable 
structure underpinning individual differences in cognition might thus be subject to 
developmental change. Systematic differences in the age structure of different study 
samples can therefore not be neglected when different species are compared.  
One might argue that identifying the latent variable structure of performance on EF tasks 
does not eliminate reference to control homunculi or black boxes [46]. While this is true, 
identifying such latent variable structure might serve as an intermediary step towards a more 
mechanistic model of EF [68]. Breaking down EF into its fundamental components will likely 
require iterative applications of the multi trait multi method approach. Conversely, inspiration 
for task designs and task selection can also be drawn from existing computational or 
mechanistic models of EF (e.g., [46, 69, 70]). For example, models that decompose 
executive control of actions further (e.g., into signal detection, action selection, and action 
execution [46]) can help to make predictions about response profiles and signature limits. 
Besides, such models might help to explain why convergent validity of inhibitory control 
measures has proved hard to establish. Any of the proposed action control subcomponents 
(or a certain combination thereof) might explain individual differences in task performance.  
In the comparative literature, individual differences in EFs have not been systematically 
investigated [71]. There are some notable exceptions linking g to working memory 
performance in mice [72, 73]. Moreover, a meta-analysis reported in this issue provides 
evidence for low to moderate convergent validity and test-retest reliability estimates for a 
number of different tasks (including inhibition and reversal learning tasks) and species [74]. 
In most taxa, however, research looking into the structure of individual differences in EF is 
missing. Fortunately, there are a number of paradigms that have been used to tax different 
EF, including working memory (e.g., [75, 76]) and inhibitory control tasks (e.g., [23, 48, 77, 
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78]). The first steps toward a psychometric examination of EF in nonhuman animals will be 
to establish the content validity and reliability of these paradigms in different species.  
Valid measures of EFs will also help us to interpret individual differences in more specific 
domains. Most behavioural tasks, especially the ones that require a change in behaviour, 
arguably will at least initially tax EFs to a varying degree (but increasing experience with task 
relevant-contingencies can lead to automatized control processes due to learning [37, 46, 
79]). It is therefore important to examine the extent to which observed differences in task 
performance are due to differences in EF. For instance, it has been suggested that 
development of EF over the pre-school years may constrain, or enable, the emergence of 
abilities such as theory of mind and object permanence [80, 81]. Interestingly, it is possible 
that a similar argument could apply over a phylogenetic time-scale [82]. 
Conclusions 
Investigating the structure of individual differences in cognitive performance within a species 
will lead to insights into the causes and consequences of individual variation and it will allow 
for more informative comparisons across species. To this end, we need to refine the 
assessment of individual differences in behavioural flexibility. Following a classic 
psychometrics approach we advocated a three-step program: first, experimental work to 
establish paradigms that yield response profiles indicative of the targeted ability; second, 
assessments of reliability of individual differences across time; third, multi-trait multi-method 
test batteries to establish validity of the targeted ability. Elucidating the structure of cognition 
across different species will be a challenging endeavour. One of the biggest obstacles will be 
to obtain sufficient sample sizes. For many species (including most primate species) that are 
difficult to access and whose sample sizes in captivity are usually small the only remedy will 
be large-scale collaborative projects across labs or field sites. This will certainly be no easy 
feat especially because such expensive, long-term projects are difficult to realize in an 
academic environment with short-term funding but there are encouraging examples in 
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related research areas that show the feasibility of such projects (e.g., the ManyBabies 
project [83]). A first pilot project aiming at establishing large-scale collaboration in the field of 
comparative cognition is currently under way (the ManyPrimates project [84]). 
In this article, we cautioned against taking short-cuts when constructing test batteries. Given 
the amount of work that is necessary to conduct a test battery with a sufficiently large 
number of individuals a trial-and-error approach cannot be recommended. Borrowing the test 
battery designed from research with another species will likely result in biased outcomes, in 
the worst scenario it might lead to ceiling or floor effects. New task designs and pilot work to 
establish certain response signatures (the content validity) within each species are advisable 
before the assembly of the test battery. Ideally, tasks are used that are scalable in difficulty 
to maximise the variance in the dataset.  
Finally, we suggest that it is time to go beyond g or the physical/social cognition divide. 
Executive functions with their strong genetic component [62], correlation to health markers 
[63], and domain generality (as established with humans) are arguably a prime candidate 
and logical starting point for this endeavour. Measuring individual differences in EFs will also 
help to interpret individual variation in more specialized abilities. To date most research in 
this area has been devoted to inhibitory control and we provide here evidence that the 
convergent validity of some widely-used measures cannot be taken for granted and will 
required further investigation. Future experimental work is needed to establish reliable and 
valid measures of other EF including attention shifting and working memory updating. 
Whenever possible, fitness and health measures and genetic samples might be added to the 
data collection to assess potential fitness consequences and to estimate heritability. In the 
long run, identifying the latent structure of cognitive abilities in a variety of species will allow 
us to trace back the evolutionary history of these abilities.  
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